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Patterns of research 
Interview with Shaun Gallagher
57 (Part II
58) 
by Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski 
The interview was realized in January 2014. 
 
What are the most appropriate questions in cognitive science as well as in 
philosophy of mind, in the second decade of the 21st century? 
I think that cognitive scientists have to question their own reigning assump-
tions about how the brain works.  There is a lot of hard data to look at, and it’s 
quite overwhelming sometimes to analyze it, but at certain points we need to 
come up for air and try to sort out what it all means.  For me the important 
questions are about assumptions we make in interpreting the data.  Do we 
frame our interpretations in terms of classical computationalism and repre-
sentationalism, or connectionist models, or dynamic systems theory, or pre-
dictive coding, or some other model?  This may look like I’m putting the entire 
focus on the brain, but I think the motivation for these questions comes from 
the more embodied approaches to cognitive science.  If the body and envi-
ronment play an essential role in cognitive and affective aspects of existence, 
then we may have to rethink our basic models of how the brain works.  Do we 
really want to maintain the Helmholtzian idea that the brain works on the 
model of inference?  When we look at the actual processes that are specified 
by the predictive coding view, for example, should we really think of them 
as inferential?   
 
How  would  you  evaluate  the  current  boom  in  predictive  concepts  of 
knowledge (in particular those inspired by Friston’s works)?  It is an in-
teresting issue for us especially in the context of neurocentrism on the 
one side of the spectrum and explicit references to Varela’s early works 
made by the supporters of these (predictive) propositions on the other.  
Do you think modern cognitive science too neurocentric? 
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Obviously the brain is one important element in cognition, as well as in other 
life processes.  On the one hand, if you’re a neuroscientist, then you need to be 
neurocentric in some sense.  It would be odd advice to tell neuroscientists they 
shouldn’t focus  on  the  nervous  system  so much.  We  want  them  to gain as 
much knowledge about the brain as they can.  On the other hand, I don’t think 
that  all  of  the  other  scientists who focus  on  cognition—developmental  psy-
chologists,  experimental  psychologists,  linguists, roboticists,  anthropologists, 
as well as philosophers—are overly focused on the brain.  In this sense I’m not 
worried about neurocentrism in the actual doing of science.  But let me add 
two caveats.  First, cognitive neuroscience in general may be a bit too central-
centrist—studying  primarily  the  central cortical processes  as  if all answers 
should be found there.  I think autonomic and peripheral processes are also 
important.  I really like István Aranyosi’s recent book on The Peripheral Mind 
(OUP 2013) and I think it should be widely circulated in the cognitive neuro-
scientific community.  Second, I’m more concerned about neurocentrism in 
the popular media rather than in science itself.  People, like Jan Slaby and 
Suparna Choudhury, who work in the area of critical neuroscience, raise im-
portant  concerns  about  how  all  the  cool  things  we  are  learning  about  the 
brain are covered in the media and are shaping the way the general public is 
thinking about human nature. 
Going back to predictive coding and Friston’s work, it’s obviously important to 
understand  the  real  dynamics  of  how  the  brain  works.    We’ve  known  for 
a long time that anticipatory processes are hugely important for perception 
and action.  Neuroscientists like Berthoz have emphasized anticipatory pro-
cesses in motor control; and in phenomenology we have Husserl’s account of 
temporality with an emphasis on protention. Work in predictive coding, and 
as I understand it, Friston’s work in particular, is important for providing an 
account  of  how  neural processing  participates  in  this  larger and pervasive 
dynamic.  But again there are questions of how to interpret what we are learn-
ing about such processes.  I’ve tried to address this in my paper with Matt 
Bower (in Avant).  Friston, and others, like Jacob Hohwy in his recent book on 
The  Predictive  Mind,  associate  predictive  coding  with  Helmholz’s  notion  of 
unconscious inference.  For visual perception, for example, it is assumed that 
since the brain has no direct access to the outside world it has to interpret or 
decode neuronal firing patterns that are generated by light hitting our retinas.  
Accordingly, the brain is seemingly inferring to the best explanation of what 
causes a particular pattern of neuronal activation. This involves figuring the 
probabilities based on current neural states of the system—a current state that 
is generated by prior experience. So how does this ‘Bayesian’ process work?  It 
involves  top-down  synaptic  inhibition  based  on  an  empirical  prior—which 
means  the  organism’s  previous  experience  and  context-sensitive  learning.  
Predictions  are  then  matched  against  ongoing  sensory  input.    If  there  is AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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a mismatch, prediction errors are sent back up the line and the system adjusts 
dynamically back and forth until there is a rela-tively good fit.  
Again, the question is how should we interpret this.  That is, if this is literally 
what  is  going  on  in  the  brain—if  we  are  talking  about  synaptic  inhibition 
based on prior experience, and a dynamic process that involve prediction er-
ror correction, then it’s not clear to me why we should think of it as a kind of 
inference  rather  than  a  kind  of  dynamic  adjustment  process  in  which  the 
brain, as part of and along with the larger organism, settles into the right kind 
of attunement with the environment. What’s going on in the brain is one inte-
grated part of the dynamics that are not just inside the brain; they are transac-
tional across brain and body and environment. 
 
What is your opinion about the nature and value of interdisciplinarity?  
Is this phenomenon a natural step in the development of knowledge? 
I’m a big fan of interdisciplinary teamwork in science.  In previous centuries 
maybe Descartes could be expert in philosophy and mathematics and physics; 
likewise, Newton in physics and theology, and Locke in medicine, law, and 
philosophy; Hume in philosophy, economics and history; Adam Smith in eco-
nomics  and  philosophy.   And as late at  the  19
th century  James could  teach 
physiology, and psychology, and philosophy.  There may still be a few geniuses 
who can claim expertise in more than one field, but given the high degree of 
specialization now required in these different fields, the rest of us need to 
work  with  others,  and  it  often  takes  an  interdisciplinary  team  to  work  on 
some questions.  This can be difficult too, since different disciplines have dif-
ferent vocabularies and think about problems in different ways.  But I always 
find  this  kind  of  interdisciplinary  work  to  be  a  learning  experience—one 
which involves a tension between maintaining standards in one’s own disci-
pline while trying to be flexible enough to accept some different ways of think-
ing about the problem that others bring to it.  All such difficulties aside, I think 
the promise of interdisciplinary research is that it can bring different perspec-
tives to bear on a problem.  A good example—over the past two years I was 
involved in a project to study experiences of awe and wonder had by astro-
nauts during space flight.  This had never been studied scientifically before.  
The project involved neuroscience, psychology, and phenomenology, as well as 
linguistic analysis and hermeneutics.  In the end we were able to report on the 
phenomenology of such experiences, but also on brain processes as they were 
tied to very specific environments (in this case, simulated space flight), and on 
the religious and cultural background of the individual subjects who partici-
pated  in  the  experiment.    The  interdisciplinary  approach  gave  us  a much 
fuller picture, in different dimensions, than would be possible if we did just 
the phenomenology, or the neuroscience, or the psychology. Patterns of research. Interview with Shaun Gallagher 
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In this regard, then, can you say more about the role of phenomenology in 
experimental research nowadays?  Is the present situation of phenome-
nology, as some claim, a little disappointing? How important is its role in 
the context of neurophenomenology? 
I’m not sure what you mean by ‘disappointing’.  I would say it’s a little differ-
ent—that the situation of phenomenology is different than it was at the begin-
ning of the 20
th century.  Maybe if some people think that it should be just the 
same as what Husserl proposed, then they may be disappointed.  We are liter-
ally  100 years  beyond the publication  of  Husserl’s  Ideas.   For  some  people 
phenomenology is just the historical bit of philosophy developed by Husserl, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so on.  But phenomenology would be 
dead if that is all it was.  Even in that history, Merleau-Ponty was already a far 
distance from Husserl, and I’m not sure that there is just one thing called phe-
nomenology.  On my view it would be sad if we were not using and developing 
phenomenology further.  Certainly the original phenomenolo-gists would be 
sad if what they developed was now just history.  I’m optimistic that phenom-
enology is still relevant to both philosophy and science.  
Neurophenomenology is one way that phenomenology remains relevant.  The 
study that I was just describing is, I think, a good example of neuropheno-
menology.  It involves a correlation between neuroscientific data and first-per-
son phenomenological report—and more than that… (You can find a full ac-
count of the study at  
http://www.chdr.cah.ucf.edu/spaceandspirituality/publications.php,  
and some specifics about the methodology we used at  
http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00608/full) 
In effect, this study would have been impossible without employing a pheno-
menological methodology.  
 
Your “A pattern theory of self” may be seen as a proposal aimed to inte-
grate the research on the self.  From our perspective, your division be-
tween the self-referential and the self-specific processes is fashioned into 
a kind of dispute between Northoff and Legrand on the neuronal basis 
of   the  self.    Do  you  think  that  your  inquiries  follow  the  direction 
of Northoff? 
My idea was to try to provide a theoretical framework that could integrate 
research on self—I agree with that.  In some regard I was trying to remain 
neutral with respect to how precisely anyone should think about the different 
aspects that constitute the pattern.  In addressing Northoff’s research I was 
suggesting that there was a way that it could find a place within this theoreti-
cal framework, without necessarily saying that I agree with the way that he 
characterizes the self.  I think that Legrand (Legrand and Ruby 2009) offers AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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a critique  of  the  kind  of  research  that  Northoff  has  done.  Legrand  and 
Northoff might themselves characterize this as a dispute.  But I was again try-
ing to indicate that Legrand’s work also could find a place within the concept 
of  a  pattern  theory  of  self.    So  I  was  suggesting  that  one  could  map  both 
Northoff’s research and  Legrand’s  research  into the broader and  relatively 
coherent theoretical landscape of research on the self, and then be able to say 
some things about how they differ, without denying that there may be ways in 
which they are simply pointing to different aspects of self.  Generally, from 
this perspective, I think that if someone would claim that their particular re-
search on self captures all we need to know about self (and I don’t think either 
Legrand or Northoff do this) then they would clearly be wrong.  The question 
then is whether we can make different research approaches and conclusions 
consistent.  Likely not; but the pattern theory may provide a framework in 
which we can work out such inconsistencies without ignoring the possibility 
that what is at stake is something much more complex.  That’s why I wrote 
that one “benefit of the pattern theory of self is that we can more clearly un-
derstand various interpretations of self as compatible or commensurable in-
stead of thinking them in opposition” (2013a).  But I also said that I didn’t 
think this would solve all philosophical problems about self.  
I  wouldn’t  say  that  this  moves  us  in  the  direction  of  Northoff.    Indeed, 
I indicate that on my own view I think that Legrand and Ruby are right—and 
I point  to  a  different  paper  where  that  agreement  is  reinforced  (Gallagher 
2012).  But in the 2013 paper I wasn’t outlining my own view, or my own pat-
tern theory of self—I was proposing the concept as a neutral framework.  Of 
course, the specifics that I included may in fact reflect my own biases in how 
I think of self, but if there are more aspects, or if one thinks that I offered too 
many parts to the pattern, then one can make the argument.  I suppose the 
only way to disagree with that concept of a pattern theory is to say that the self 
is not a pattern at all, but just one thing that may or may not be one of the as-
pects I included in the pattern.  And there are other interesting questions that 
can be explored.  For example, what status does a pattern have—is it some-
thing real or something that is perceiver-relative?—important questions ex-
plored by Dennett (1991) and Haugeland (1993).  
 
Your research spans a variety of topics—from self and psychopathology 
to education.    Which  of  these  problems  are  in  your  opinion  currently 
most important? 
I think a lot of these topics are interrelated, and I’m not sure I can say that one 
is more important than the other.  You didn’t mention intersubjectivity, and 
I think that is something that ties these other issues together, although they 
also relate in other ways.  I think that if you focus enough on one topic it leads 
to the others.  An obvious example is the connection between self and psycho-Patterns of research. Interview with Shaun Gallagher 
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pathology, something emphasized by phenomenologists like Josef Parnas in 
Copenhagen and Louis Sass at Rutgers.  Many psychopathologies also involve 
problems with intersubjectivity.  Self-identity is also shaped by intersubjective 
and cultural forces, and this would certainly include educational institutions.   
 
What is your opinion about social science studies on distribution of cog-
nitive activity between human and non-human agents.  We mean works 
by Bruno Latour, Michael Lynch etc.  They seem to be of interest for some 
cognitive scientists, from Edwin Hutchins to Lambros Malafouris. 
Yes, I find them interesting too.  I’ve been developing the idea of a socially 
extended mind, by which I mean that our cognitive processes are extended 
not only by technological means or the kind of hand-held devices that Clark 
and Chalmers, following Hutchins, talk about, or artifacts (Malafouris), or en-
vironments (Kim Sterelny), etc.—all of which I think are important and inter-
esting—but also by large institutional practices (Gallagher 2013b). I’ve focused 
on the legal system—a cognitive institution that helps us to solve certain prob-
lems.  But science itself, understood as a cognitive system, may be an even 
clearer example.  Latour’s work is certainly relevant in this regard.  So I think 
understanding social structures and what institutions do to us, not only in 
terms of cognition and problem solving, sometimes enhancing our cognitive 
abilities, and sometimes distorting them or limiting them, but also as human 
agents who live in intersubjective and social arrangements.  Institutions can 
also distort our human relations—so these are topics not only for cognitive 
science, but also for critical theory. 
 
What are your most important non-academic interests? 
My family—most important.  I take a non-academic interest in them.  My wife 
and two daughters are doing interesting non-academic things and I try to keep 
up with them.  My mother and sister and her family live in Philadelphia, my 
hometown, and I don’t visit them enough.  Living in Memphis is very cool—
the music is fantastic, so I’ve been getting more interested in that, which is 
a return to something I loved when I was younger.  Beyond that, food, wine, 
the beach and travel.  
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